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Information, Authority, and Corporate Hierarchies
Abstract
In a typical corporate hierarchy, the manager is delegated the authority to make
strategic decisions, and to contract with other employees. By studying a model
with one principal and two agents where one agent can gather information that is
valuable for the principal’s project choice and the other agent provides effort to the
chosen project, we study when the principal can benefit from such delegation relative
to centralization. We show that beneficial delegation is possible when complete
contracts cannot be written, and delegation of authority should necessarily be to
the information gatherer. The benefits of delegation stem from either efficiency
gains or reduction in rent to the information gatherer.
JEL Codes: C72, D21, D82, L22.
Keywords: Corporate hierarchies, information gathering, delegation, centralization.
I. Introduction
The so-called separation of ownership and control (Berle and Means, 1932;
Fama and Jensen, 1983) refers to the fact that the nominal owners of corporations
- shareholders - delegate authority to managers. The authority is vested in several
important dimensions for the top managers of corporations. They make strategic
decisions that set directions for corporations, employ subordinates, and contract
with external suppliers. This multiple dimension of authority is a deciding factor
for the organizational structure of modern corporations. Rather than a set of two-
tier hierarchies in which owners are at the top of each two-tier hierarchy, modern
corporations are often organized as multi-tier hierarchies where managers are placed
between owners and other stakeholders.(1) Chandler (1977, 1990) attributes such
a transformation of family-oriented ‘personal capitalism’ to ‘managerial capitalism’
in the US to a sharp increase in demand for, and supply of professional, qualified
managers as corporations become larger with increasingly sophisticated operations.
The resulting modern business enterprise, according to Chandler, is an organization
with many distinct operating units that are managed by a hierarchy of professional,
salaried executives. In such organizations, shareholders hire top managers - through
boards - and managers, in turn, hire subordinates or contract with external suppli-
ers. Why are such multi-tier hierarchies, rather than multiple two-tier hierarchies,
often the norm? Why are managers, instead of other stakeholders, at the center of
the multi-tier hierarchy?
The first step to answering the questions above is to understand the manager’s
role. In his classic work, Simon (1977) argues that the most important role of
manager is gathering, processing information, and making decisions based on this.(2)
He writes:
Executives and their staffs spend a large fraction of their time surveying the
economic, technical, political and social environment to identify new conditions
that call for new actions. They probably spend an even larger fraction of their
time [...], seeking to invent, design, and develop possible courses of action for
handling situations where a decision is needed (Simon, 1977, p. 40).
Radner (1992, 1993) also treats information processing and decision making as the
manager’s main task, distinct from the roles played by other employees. According
to him, managing is a specialized activity, synonymous to decision making, distinct
from ‘production’. The manager’s role as a decision maker is legitimized by author-
ity, which can be defined as the ‘power to make decisions which guide the actions
of another’ (Simon, 1997, p. 179).
(1) Separation of ownership and control in this sense, although not universally the case, is most
prevalent in the Anglo-American system of corporate governance. See La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes
and Shleifer (1999).
(2) Case studies by Mintzberg (1973) provide rich supporting evidence for this.
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Granted that the manager’s role is information gathering and decision making,
a natural question is why owners voluntarily delegate authority to the manager. On
efficiency grounds at least, it seems that the authority to make decisions should rest
with the party who can gather or has necessary information and the ability to use
it.(3) Indeed, a typical explanation for delegation in corporations is based on the
manager’s expertise and the ensuing benefits of specialization. Jensen and Murphy
(1990) put it aptly:
Managers often have better information than shareholders and boards in iden-
tifying investment opportunities and assessing the profitability of potential
projects; indeed, the expectation that managers will make superior investment
decisions explains why shareholders relinquish decision rights over their assets
by purchasing common stocks (Jensen and Murphy, 1990, p. 251).
Underlying the above explanation is the supposition that communicating the man-
ager’s information is costly, or that shareholders or boards do not have necessary
expertise to process the information for decision-making even if communication is
costless.(4) For, otherwise, shareholders or boards will be able to make decisions
based on the manager’s information, which is the central insight from the revelation
principle. While the efficiency benefits from delegation are reasonable to expect, it
is less clear whether or how the efficiency benefits can flow back to shareholders.
Specifically if delegation results in too much rent dissipated to the manager, then
shareholders would be worse off despite overall efficiency gains.
This paper proposes a model that highlights the manager’s role as information
gatherer and decision maker, and formalizes when and why owners can benefit from
delegating authority to the manager. The existing literature has studied hierarchical
delegation either by adopting the conventional adverse selection or moral hazard
models, or by using an incomplete contracting approach.(5) In the former approach,
the manager’s information is about the hidden cost parameter or actions of other
agents within the organization, rather than about the conditions external to the
organization that call for new actions. The manager’s role in this case is akin to
that of supervisor or monitor, rather than what is described by Simon or Radner.
In the latter approach, the manager’s information is relevant for decision making
and the focus is on the allocation of decision authority, but the issues of contracting
are largely left untouched. The main innovation of our paper is two-fold. First, we
focus on the two most salient aspects of authority within the firm, the authority
to make decisions and the authority to design and offer contracts to other parties.
Thus we complement the incomplete contracting literature on organization design by
(3) See, for example, Milgrom and Roberts (1992), or Baron and Kreps (1999).
(4) The benefits of hierarchies facing the costs of communicating and processing information
have been put forward by Arrow (1974) and Williamson (1983) among many others.
(5) This literature is reviewed in Section II.
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considering both decision authority and contracting authority. Second, we provide
conditions under which a multi-tier hierarchy emerges as an optimal organizational
structure where the manager, not other parties, is at the center of the hierarchy.
The multi-tier hierarchy thus identified may be regarded as a reasonable portrayal
of corporate hierarchy. We sketch below the key features of our model and the
intuition behind the main result.
Consider a firm that consists of an owner and two heterogenous agents. The
owner has two investment projects and the return from each project depends on the
state of nature. One agent can, at some costs, acquire private information about the
state of nature, which can be used for project choice. We call this agent the man-
ager. The other agent, whom we call the worker, can exert effort that can increase
the likelihood that the chosen project is successful. An organizational structure
specifies allocation of authority. We consider two types of authority, one related
to contract design and the other related to project choice. In any organizational
structure, the owner retains the authority to contract with at least one agent. We
will call this contract the primary contract. So the first type of authority, called
the contracting authority, specifies who designs and makes a take-it-or-leave offer of
contract to the agent who does not hold the primary contract. The second type of
authority, called the decision authority, refers to the right to make a project choice
decision. In exercising the decision authority, the party can demand communication
of information from the manager if, of course, the manager is not the party with de-
cision authority. Our focus is on the owner’s problem of choosing an organizational
structure that maximizes her expected payoff.
In centralization, the owner has both types of authority while in delegation,
one or both types of authority is delegated to the agents. Of particular interest
is when both types of authority are delegated to the manager. In this case, the
organizational structure can be described as a three-tier hierarchy where the man-
ager is at the center of the hierarchy. We consider two contracting environments.
In the first environment called complete contracting, the communication of man-
ager’s information, project choice, and the return from the chosen project are all
contractible upon.(6) In the second environment called partial contracting, only the
return is contractible upon.
We first show that, in the complete contracting environment, the owner cannot
benefit from any forms of delegation, hence centralization is her preferred organiza-
tional structure. This is a direct consequence of the revelation principle although our
model has elements of post-contractual information asymmetry and moral hazard.
With costless communication of manager’s information, the owner can centrally
implement any outcome that can be implemented when the manager is delegated
(6) In the model we study, the case where only project choice and return are contractible upon
is equivalent to the case of complete contracting, as explained in Section III.
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authority. Thus centralization is equivalent to any organizational structures where
the manager is delegated one or both types of authority. If authority is delegated
to the worker, however, the owner is strictly worse off due to limited liability. This
is because the worker’s incentive problem conditional on the manager’s information
is the same under centralization and delegation, whence conferring the contract-
ing authority to the worker results in double marginalization of rent (McAfee and
McMillan, 1995; Mookherjee, 2006).
In the partial contracting environment, centralization continues to dominate
any organizational structures in which the worker is delegated authority. However,
delegating authority to the manager, the contracting authority in particular, can
benefit the owner. The benefits from delegating authority to the manager come
from two sources.
First, if the two projects are sufficiently different in their return distributions,
then the manager may find it optimal not to acquire information but send a message
to the owner that would result in his preferred project to be chosen. This is because,
in centralization in the partial contracting environment, the manager’s contract is
independent of the worker’s contract, depending only on the return from the cho-
sen project, not on his information communicated to the owner. The manager’s
communication, of course, carries no information content and the owner optimally
bypasses the manager. In this case, centralization results in a suboptimal invest-
ment decision and inefficient effort provision by the worker. Delegating authority to
the manager can change this as it makes him a residual claimant in the subcontract-
ing stage. Thus the manager’s payoff in delegation is dependent on the worker’s
contract he would offer, and indirectly on project choice as well. This motivates the
manager to acquire information since proper exercise of authority requires informa-
tion acquisition, which, albeit at cost, can pay off since it can increase his residual
claim. Thus delegation can result in an optimal investment decision and efficient
effort provision by the worker. Such efficiency gains from delegation are weighed
against the costs of motivating the manager. We show that delegation is more likely
to dominate centralization if the manager’s cost of information acquisition becomes
smaller, the manager’s information becomes more valuable, and the worker’s cost
of effort becomes larger.
Second, even when centralization can induce information acquisition and im-
plement an optimal investment decision, delegation of authority to the manager
can benefit the owner as it can reduce the rent that the owner needs to pay the
manager to motivate him to acquire and communicate information truthfully. Once
again, the residual claim given to the manager in the subcontracting stage enables
the owner to provide tighter incentives to the manager, thereby reducing the cost
of observing the manager’s incentive constraints under centralization.
Our work differs from and complements the existing literature at least in three
ways. First, the manager is not endowed with private information in our model.
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Rather, he needs to incur private costs to acquire information. Because of costly in-
formation acquisition, there are benefits from delegating authority to the manager.
In the existing studies on hierarchy, there is no a priori reason why a particular
agent should be at the center of the multi-tier hierarchy.(7) It could be any of the
agents supplying inputs. In our model, delegation can benefit the owner only when
the manager, not the worker, assumes the role of the delegated agent. Thus the ben-
efits of delegation come from circumventing the irreconcilable conflicts between the
information gatherer and the decision maker, which may arise under centralization,
preventing a certain outcome from being implementable.
Second and related, the managerial input and the worker’s input are quite dis-
tinct. As stressed in the aforementioned quotes by Simon (1977), Radner (1992,
1993), and Jensen and Meckling (1990), the manager’s information acquisition and
subsequent decision making are what distinguish managerial inputs from those of
other employees in corporations. Roughly speaking, the manager’s decision making
can be identified with the choice of a particular distribution of profits, while other
employees’ inputs affect the likelihood of profit realization given the chosen distri-
bution. It is in this sense that the manager’s main role can be described as that of
direction setting. We thus expect optimal incentive schemes for the manager to be
quite different from those for other employees. Indeed we show that the manager,
when delegated authority, can actively affect his own payoff through the choice of
project and the design of contract for the worker. For the worker, the scope of
such influence upon his own payoff is limited, as is the case for employees lower in
the corporate hierarchy; the worker in our paper is paid an efficiency wage under
manager delegation.(8)
Third, our results show that beneficial delegation to the manager is possible
only when complete contracts cannot be written due to either complexity or con-
tracting costs. This is consistent with managerial contracts in the real world, which
are almost all output-based and other information such as the manager’s report or
project choice is hardly used. Thus the dominance of delegation over centralization
in our partial contracting environment seems to square well with reality. Finally, the
only information-related cost in our model is that of information gathering by the
manager. For clarity of exposition and tractability of analysis, we leave out other
information-related costs. Any additional costs of communicating information (e.g.,
Laffont and Martimort, 1998) or processing it (e.g., Radner, 1993; Van Zandt, 1999)
(7) Baliga and Sjo¨stro¨m (1998) is a notable exception, although the agent at the center of the
hierarchy in their model is the one who can observe the other agent’s effort, rather than acquire
external information that can be used for decision making.
(8) One could take this as an incentives-based explanation of why stock options have been the
single most important incentive for CEOs in Anglo-American corporations (Murphy, 1999). While
the use of stock options for non-executive employees was also growing in the late 1990s (Core and
Guay, 2001), the proportion of incentives provided through stock options is eclipsed compared to
that for CEOs (The Economist, 2003, p. 9.).
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would only strengthen the case for delegation to the information gatherer.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II reviews the related
literature. Section III describes the model. The case of complete contracting is
studied in Section IV while Section V is on the partial contracting environment.
Section VI compares centralization with delegation to the manager. Section VII
concludes the paper. The appendix contains the proofs of the results that are not
central to the exposition of our main ideas.
II. Related Literature
The main focus of this paper, namely an optimal multi-tier hierarchy, is directly
related to a large body of literature on incentive-based explanations of hierarchy.(9)
We refer the readers to Mookherjee (2006) for an excellent review and discuss only
briefly where our paper stands relative to the existing studies. For convenience, we
divide the literature broadly into two categories.
First, many studies adopt the conventional adverse selection model with one
principal and at least two agents, where each agent has private information about
his production cost. In an environment where the revelation principle applies, cen-
tralization cannot be dominated by any other mechanisms. Thus hierarchy can be
equivalent to centralization at best. The equivalence of centralization and hierar-
chy under some conditions is shown, among others, by Baron and Besanko (1992),
Gilbert and Riordan (1995), and Melumad, Mookherjee and Reichelstein (1995).
Faure-Grimaud, Laffont and Martimort (2003) also show the equivalence when one
of the agents is replaced by a supervisor, whose primary role is to observe the
productive agent’s cost information. When conditions for the revelation principle
do not hold, hierarchy can dominate centralization. This is shown by Laffont and
Martimort (1998) when there are limits on communication and the possibility of col-
lusion between agents, and by Melumad, Mookherjee and Reichelstein (1992, 1997)
under restrictions on message space. On the other hand, Mookherjee and Tsumagari
(2004) generalize the model in Laffont and Martimort (1998) to show that hierarchy
is in general strictly dominated by centralization due to double marginalization of
rents.(10) The latter is also shown by McAfee and McMillan (1995) when contracts
are subject to limited liability.
Second, a number of papers study the standard moral hazard setting with one
(9) Other strands of literature on multi-tier hierarchy are concerned with the issue of monitoring
and loss of control (Williamson, 1967; Calvo and Wellisz, 1978; Qian, 1994), or the information-
processing capacity of hierarchy (Radner, 1993; Van Zandt, 1999). Hart and Moore (2005) focus
on the allocation of authority within hierarchies but without the element of incentives.
(10) The main difference between Laffont and Martimort (1998) and Mookherjee and Tsuma-
gari (2004) is that, in the former, the cost types are binary and the bargaining power in the
side-contracting at the collusion stage is fixed exogenously. In Mookherjee and Tsumagari, the
bargaining power in the collusion stage is determined endogenously by the initial contract offered
by the principal. Because of this, the principal can control the outcome from collusion to some
extent.
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principal and two agents where each agent takes hidden action. Baliga and Sjo¨stro¨m
(1998), and Macho-Stadler and Pe´rez-Castrillo (1998) show the equivalence of hi-
erarchy and a centralized mechanism subject to the possibility of collusion. An
additional conclusion of Baliga and Sjo¨stro¨m relates to the pattern of hierarchical
delegation: when one agent can freely observe the other agent’s action but not vice
versa, the agent with superior information should be delegated the contracting au-
thority. While not directly concerned with multi-tier hierarchies, Itoh (1992, 1993)
also studies a multiple-agent moral hazard environment to examine conditions un-
der which the principal can benefit by allowing coalition of agents, when agents can
monitor each other. These findings can also be regarded as supportive of delegation
over centralization when agents have informational advantages over the principal.
Our paper shares common interest with the above studies, but differs from
them in motivation and modelling approach. Our goal is to understand the emer-
gence of corporate hierarchy where decision maker and input supplier are linked in
a hierarchical fashion. This led us to introduce two heterogeneous agents, an infor-
mation gatherer and an input supplier. In line with the manager’s role as described
by Simon (1977), Radner (1992, 1993), and Jensen and Murphy (1990), we show
that an optimal hierarchy should necessarily have the information gatherer at the
middle tier of the hierarchy. In an optimal hierarchy, the information gatherer has
both decision making authority and contracting authority. In contrast, a hierarchy
in the above studies is delineated by and large by the contracting authority only.
The agent in the middle tier of the hierarchy is not a decision maker but only ob-
serves other agent’s hidden cost parameter or action, which he communicates to the
principal or uses in designing the contract for the other agent. Such a role is akin
to monitoring or supervision. As the earlier quotation from Simon (1997) suggests,
the manager’s role is to gather information external to the firm and make strategic
decisions, going beyond that of monitoring or supervising subordinates.
A number of recent studies have been concerned with the allocation of author-
ity within an organization in tackling coordination problems (Athey and Roberts,
2001; Friebel and Raith, 2006; Dessein, Garicano and Gertner, 2007; Alonso, Des-
sein and Matouschek, 2008; Rantakari, 2008). For example, Alonso, Dessein and
Matouschek (2008) and Rantakari (2008) show that coordination can be achieved
through cheap talk communication between division managers when they are given
the decision authority, the benefits of which increase with decentralization. How-
ever, these studies are not directly concerned with multi-tier hierarchies. On the
other hand, Choe and Ishiguro (2008) show that, in the absence of such communi-
cation, hierarchical delegation can be another way to improve coordination relative
to complete decentralization. These studies typically follow the control rights litera-
ture initiated by Aghion and Tirole (1997). Thus there is no formal contract except
for the allocation of decision authority. Our paper is also concerned with the allo-
cation of authority but it incorporates both the decision and contracting authority.
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With formal contracts and no limit on communication, the decision authority turns
out not to have much bite but the contracting authority does matter. In particular,
we show how delegation of contracting authority can benefit the principal when it
is to the information gatherer, but hurts it is to the input supplier.
Finally, the aspect of information gathering by the manager in our model can
be related to several studies on strategic information gathering. Cre´mer and Khalil
(1992) allow the possibility for the agent to gather information after the contract is
offered but before it is signed. In case unfavorable states are observed, the agent can
reject the contract. They show that the principal offers a contract that induces the
agent not to gather information, hence information remains symmetric. In related
papers, Cre´mer and Khalil (1994), and Cre´mer, Khalil and Rochet (1998) consider a
situation where the agent can gather costly information before a contract is offered.
Information does not have social value in these studies, as it will become known at no
cost once the parties sign a contract. Therefore, the main reason for socially wasteful
information gathering is for the agent to improve his bargaining position. A general
message from these studies is that such pre-contractual information gathering leads
to deviation from the first-best efficient allocation. Information gathering in our
paper is quite different from that in these studies: the manager’s information is
valuable for project choice and subsequent contracting with the worker, hence the
optimal contract for the manager is structured to provide incentives for information
gathering.
III. The Model
A. Players, Technology and Outcomes
There are three parties, a principal and two heterogeneous agents, whom we
call the manager and the worker.(11) The principal has two projects, called A and B.
The return from either project is random with a binary support X := {x, 0} where
x > 0. We call the event of positive return a success. The probability of success
from project A depends on the underlying state, θ, and the worker’s action which is
a binary choice between “work” or “shirk”. The monetary cost of work is ` > 0 and
that of shirk is normalized to 0. The state θ is a binary random variable assuming
θ1 and θ2 with probabilities pi ∈ (0, 1) and 1 − pi, respectively. The probability
of success from project A is pi ∈ (0, 1) in state θi if the worker chooses work; If
the worker chooses shirk, the probability of success is 0 in both states.(12) Project
B does not require the worker’s input and has a success probability of q ∈ (0, 1)
regardless of state.
(11) We will use the female gender pronoun for the principal and the male gender pronoun for
the manager and the worker.
(12) This simplifies notation and analysis. Our main qualitative results are robust to different
success probabilities when the worker shirks, as long as they are sufficiently small.
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That the return from project B has the same support as project A is to ensure
that the return does not reveal which project was chosen.(13) Also the assumption
that project B does not require the worker’s input is for the sake of simplicity.
What is essential is that the worker’s optimal action is necessarily state-dependent,
of which the simplest case is where only project A requires the worker’s input.
The return from either project is publicly observable and verifiable, while the
worker’s action is private information. After a state θ ∈ {θ1, θ2} is realized, the
manager is the only party that can observe a signal that is correlated with the
state, which will be called information gathering. Information gathering is costly to
the manager, and its monetary equivalent cost is c > 0. For simplicity we assume
that the signal is a perfect predictor of the state, i.e., the manager observes the true
state θ if he gathers information. If the manager does not gather information, then
he observes nothing and we denote this null signal by ∅, so the set of all possible
signals is Θ := {θ1, θ2, ∅}.
The precise order of events differs depending on organizational structures,
which will be described in the next subsection. In any organizational structure, each
agent is offered a contract that specifies compensation contingent on contractible
variables. We assume that both agents are risk-neutral and maximize the expected
compensation net of any cost. The principal is also risk-neutral and maximizes the
expected return net of compensation payments. The aforementioned structure of
the game is common knowledge. Our focus is on the principal’s problem of choosing
an organizational structure that is best for her.
Next, we introduce restrictions on parameter values that would make the prob-
lem of contracting with multiple agents interesting and non-trivial. If pix− ` ≥ qx
for i = 1, 2, it is optimal to undertake project A and induce work regardless of state.
If pix − ` ≤ qx for i = 1, 2, on the other hand, it is optimal to undertake project
B regardless of state, in which case worker’s input is irrelevant. In both cases the
manager’s information is not valuable and the solution to the principal’s problem is
trivial. An interesting case of multi-agent contracting thus arises when the worker’s
optimal action depends on the manager’s information. Therefore, we assume that
the manager’s information is valuable, i.e., without loss of generality,
ASSUMPTION 1: p1x− ` > qx > p2x− `.
Then, the ex post efficiency is obtained in the following outcome:
(C1) Project A is chosen and the worker works in θ1, and project B is undertaken
in θ2. The total expected surplus is V1 := pi(p1x− `) + (1− pi)qx− c.
For this outcome to be implemented, the manager should gather information, so
that project A (B, resp.) is chosen in θ1 (θ2, resp.), followed by the worker choosing
(13) As will become clear, this assumption of ‘no moving support’ limits the set of feasible
contracts the principal can use when only return is contractible.
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work if θ = θ1. This outcome is indeed socially optimal if the extra surplus from
the use of manager’s information exceeds the cost of his gathering information, c.
However, whether the principal would wish to implement (C1) depends on the cost
of inducing the manager to gather information and report truthfully, which may
be larger than c due to limited liability. If it is too high, then the principal will
implement an alternative outcome.
To see what other outcomes the principal needs to consider, notice first that,
whenever the manager’s information is used, the worker should be induced to work
for project A only in θ1 since qx > p2x − `. That is, any outcome in which the
manager’s information is used should necessarily be (C1). Thus the only other
outcomes the principal needs to consider in addition to (C1) are the ones in which
the manager’s information is not used. There are two such outcomes that are not
dominated:
(C2) Project A is undertaken regardless of the state and the worker works. The
total expected surplus is V2 := [pip1 + (1− pi)p2]x− `.
(C3) Project B is undertaken regardless of the state, in which case the worker’s
input is irrelevant. The total expected surplus is V3 := qx.
The principal can easily implement (C2), e.g., by offering a null contract to the
manager, always choosing project A, and offering the worker a contract specifying a
payment of w = `/[pip1 + (1− pi)p2] in case of success and w = 0 otherwise. Hence,
the principal’s expected payoff from implementing (C2) is equal to the entire surplus
V2. The principal can also implement (C3) trivially by always choosing project B
without engaging either agent, whence again extracting the total surplus V3. These
two outcomes are the principal’s fall-back options. Since (C3) is not an interesting
case, we assume
ASSUMPTION 2: V2 > V3 ⇐⇒ pip1 + (1− pi)p2 − q > `/x.
Finally we assume V1 > V2 since, otherwise, the multi-agent contracting prob-
lem is reduced to the standard principal-agent problem between the principal and
the worker. This is because V1 is the maximum possible surplus the principal can at-
tain by engaging the manager while she can always secure V2 by directly contracting
with the worker without the manager’s information.
ASSUMPTION 3: V1 > V2 ⇐⇒ (1− pi)(qx+ `− p2x) > c.
The term (1 − pi)(qx + ` − p2x) shows the potential benefits from using the
manager’s information: θ2 is observed with probability 1 − pi, in which case it is
optimal to choose project B for the expected return of qx, instead of choosing
project A and hiring the worker, which returns p2x− `. Since the former is larger
than the latter due to Assumption 1,(14) the value of manager’s information can
(14) The first part of Assumption 1, p1x − ` ≥ qx, is implied by Assumptions 2 and 3 since
V1 > V3 implies p1x− ` > qx+ c/pi.
10
be measured as the difference between the two, qx − (p2x − `). Given that the
manager’s information gathering cost is c, Assumption 3 means that the manager’s
information is valuable.
Note that the above assumptions imply that pi is neither too large nor too
small. If it is so large that θ = θ1 almost certainly, then there is no need for the
manager’s information and the principal is better off implementing (C2). Similarly,
if pi is too small, then θ = θ2 almost certainly, in which case (C3) can be the best
option for the principal.(15) Given Assumption 2, (C2) is the principal’s fall-back
option, which she can implement through centralized contracting. Therefore, in the
sequel we focus on various organizational structures that the principal can adopt to
implement (C1).
B. Authority and Organizational Structure
Based on the possible events described above, we now discuss various organiza-
tional structures that can be adopted to govern contracts among the three parties.
There are three public actions to be taken in our model: selecting a project
between A and B, contracting with the manager, and contracting with the worker.
An organizational structure specifies allocation of authority as to who takes which
of these three actions. In each contracting, we assume that the party with the
authority makes a take-it-or-leave offer to the other party. In making a project
choice, the party with the authority can demand communication of information
from the manager unless, of course, the manager has the authority.
By centralization we mean an organizational structure in which the principal
takes all three actions. In terms of timing, the manager’s contract should be offered
before the manager gathers information since, otherwise, the manager would not
gather information due to the hold-up problem (i.e., the cost of information gath-
ering would be already sunk at the time of contracting). On the other hand, the
worker’s contract can be offered either before or after the principal makes a project
choice decision. However, since the worker’s input is needed only in project A and
our focus is on (C1), it is easy to see that the worker’s incentive problem turns out
to be the same in both cases. So we assume that the worker’s contract is offered
after project choice. Thus events unfold in the following order. First, the princi-
pal offers a contract to the manager. Second, a state is realized and the manager
makes a decision on information gathering. Third, the manager communicates his
information to the principal, based on which the principal makes a project choice.
If project A is chosen, then the principal offers a contract to the worker, who then
chooses his action. Return from the chosen project realizes and payments are made
according to the contracts.
(15) To be precise, the lower bound of pi implied by Assumption 2 is [` − (p2 − q)x]/(p1 − p2)x
and the upper bound of pi implied by Assumption 3 is 1− c/[`− (p2 − q)x].
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Being the ultimate residual claimant, the principal always retains the authority
to contract with at least one agent who we call the primary agent. By delegation we
mean any organizational structure in which the primary agent is bestowed with the
right to make a contract with the other agent, called the contracting authority, or
the right to make a project choice decision, called the decision authority. Depending
on whether one or both of these authorities are delegated, we subdivide delegation
into partial delegation and full delegation.
Within partial delegation, the principal may retain the decision authority but
delegates the contracting authority to the primary agent. We call this MC-delegation
if the manager is the primary agent, and WC-delegation if the worker is. In either
case, the contract between the two agents specifies payments from the primary
agent, rather than the principal, to the other agent for various contractible contin-
gencies. The key aspect in this type of partial delegation is hierarchical contracting:
in MC-delegation, for example, the principal offers a contract to the manager, who
in turn offers a contract to the worker. In MC-delegation, the timing of events is the
same as in centralization except that, in the penultimate stage when the principal
chooses the project, the manager rather than the principal offers a contract to the
worker. In WC-delegation, the timing changes. First, the principal offers a contract
to the worker. After this, the worker offers a contract to the manager, who then
decides on information gathering. This is followed by the manager’s communication
with the principal, who then makes a project choice. Finally the worker chooses his
action if project A is chosen.
Alternatively, the principal may retain the contracting authority but delegates
the decision authority to the primary agent. We call this MD-delegation if the man-
ager is the primary agent, and WD-delegation if the worker is. In MD-delegation,
the principal offers a contract to the manager, who then decides on information
gathering and chooses a project. If project A is chosen, then the principal offers a
contract to the worker. In WD-delegation, a meaningful exercise of decision author-
ity by the worker requires the worker’s contract be offered before communication of
the manager’s information. Thus the timing of events changes. First, the principal
offers contracts to both agents. This is followed by the manager’s communication of
information to the worker, who then makes a project choice and chooses his action.
In full delegation, either the manager is delegated with both types of authority,
called M-delegation, or the worker is, called W-delegation. In M-delegation, the
primary contract is between the principal and the manager, while in W-delegation,
it is between the principal and the worker. The timing of events in M-delegation is
the same as in MC-delegation except that the manager, rather than the principal,
makes a project choice decision without communicating his information. Likewise,
the timing of events in W-delegation is the same as in WC-delegation except that
the worker replaces the principal in communicating with the manager and making
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the project choice decision.(16)
Which one of these organizational structures can be considered as a three-tier
hierarchy depends on what we mean by a two-tier hierarchy. For example, if a
two-tier hierarchy refers only to a contractual relation between two parties, then
MC-delegation, WC-delegation, M-delegation and W-delegation all lead to three-
tier hierarchies. If the party in the middle of the three-tier hierarchy should have
the decision authority as well, then only M-delegation and W-delegation exhibit
three-tier hierarchies. Figure 1 shows all possible organizational structures where
the solid line connecting two parties represents the contracting authority held by
the party in the upper box while the decision authority is indicated within the box.
— Figure 1 goes about here. —
At this point we introduce some notation that will facilitate subsequent analysis
of various organizational structures described above. In doing so, we use subscript p
for the principal, m for the manager, and w for the worker. We denote the manager’s
information gathering decision by δm ∈ {0, 1} where δm = 1 if the manager gathers
information. If the decision authority is held by the manager (i.e., in MD-delegation
and M-delegation), the project choice decision is denoted by a mapping ψm : Θ →
{A,B}. In all other organizational structures, the communication of manager’s
information is denoted by a mapping γm : Θ → Θ˜ where Θ˜ denotes the message
space, and the project choice decision by either the principal or the worker, depends
on the manager’s report and is denoted by a mapping ψj : Θ˜→ {A,B} for j = p, w.
The worker’s action choice is relevant only when project A is chosen, which is
denoted by δw ∈ {0, 1} where δw = 1 if the worker chooses work.
C. Contracting Environment
The outcome from each organizational structure depends on specific contracting
environment. We consider two types of contracting environment depending on which
variables are contractible upon. Since the manager’s information gathering and the
worker’s action are both private, there are potentially three remaining variables that
can be used for contracting purposes: the return from the project, the identity of
chosen project, and the manager’s report regarding the state he may have observed.
In the first environment, called complete contracting, all three variables are
contractible. In the second environment, called partial contracting,(17) there are
(16) There are other possibilities of full delegation, called mixed delegation, where one agent has
the contracting authority while the other agent has the decision authority. As will become clear
from our analysis, what matters is the contracting authority. Thus mixed delegation where the
manager (worker, resp.) has the contracting authority is equivalent to M-delegation (W-delegation,
resp.).
(17) We use the term ‘partial’ contracting instead of ‘incomplete’ contracting since the latter
usually refers to the case where allocation of authority is the only contractible variable and explicit
performance-based incentives are absent.
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two cases to consider. The first case is where project choice and return are con-
tractible but the manager’s report is not, and the second case is where only return
is contractible. As will become clear as we go on, optimal contracts in the first case
lead to the same outcome and the same payoffs for all the parties as in the case of
complete contracting. While this is due to the binary nature of the manager’s infor-
mation and project choice in our model, the equivalence continues to hold as long
as the cardinality of the manager’s information set is not less than the cardinality
of project choice decision. For this reason, in the sequel we take it granted that
partial contracting refers to the case that only return is contractible upon. Unless
otherwise indicated, we focus on limited liability contracts that have a lower bound
of zero for payments to the manager and the worker in each contingency.
In what follows we study the organizational structure and contracts that the
principal can use to implement her preferred outcome in the two contracting envi-
ronments. An organizational structure is said to dominate another organizational
structure if the principal’s equilibrium expected payoff from the former is larger
than that from the latter.
IV. Complete Contracting
Since the principal can implement (C2) in centralization without leaving any
rent to either agent as shown above, and the outcome (C3) is inferior due to As-
sumption 2, the principal’s problem is the choice between outcomes (C1) and (C2).
In particular, she does not need to consider organizational structures other than
centralization if she wishes to implement (C2). Delegation may be beneficial only
when it implements (C1) at a lower cost than in centralization. Thus, our focus
below is on the organizational structure and contracts that implement (C1).
Unless the manager has the decision authority, implementing (C1) requires hon-
est reporting by the manager. Therefore, it suffices to consider Θ˜ = {θ˜1, θ˜2} where θ˜i
is interpreted as the message the manager sends when θ = θi, i = 1, 2. Consequently,
the equilibrium communication strategy that implements (C1) is γm(θi) = θ˜i for
i = 1, 2, which we take as granted in the sequel. Note that this applies to the partial
contracting environment as well.
In addition, unless the worker has any authority, implementing (C1) requires
that either the principal or the manager contract with the worker to induce work,
conditional on the knowledge that θ = θ1 and project A is undertaken. Then
the worker’s contract that implements (C1) is simplified to (wx, w0) where wr is
the wage when return is r ∈ X. Since the worker chooses work if and only if
wx − w0 ≥ `/p1, the optimal contract for the worker is wx = `/p1 and w0 = 0,
whether it is designed by the principal or by the manager. Clearly this contract
does not leave any rent to the worker.
LEMMA 1. In any organizational structure where the worker does not have any
14
authority, the optimal contract for the worker when (C1) is implemented is wx =
`/p1 and w0 = 0 when θ = θ1 and project A is chosen, and a null contract, i.e.,
wx = w0 = 0, when θ = θ2.
A. Centralization
Our focus is on perfect Bayesian equilibria that implement (C1), which neces-
sarily requires honest reporting by the manager. In such an equilibrium, we have
δm = 1, γm(θi) = θ˜i for i = 1, 2, ψp(θ˜1) = A, ψp(θ˜2) = B, and δw = 1 only in θ1.
By Bayes rule, the following beliefs are immediate: the principal believes the true
state to be θi upon receiving a report θ˜i from the manager; the worker believes the
state to be θ1 (θ2, resp.) upon observing the project choice of A (B, resp.). Since
the optimal contract for the worker is as in Lemma 1, it remains to identify the
optimal contract for the manager that the principal would choose to implement the
outcome specified above.
A manager’s contract is represented by s : Θ˜×{A,B}×X → <+ where s(θ˜, k, r)
specifies a non-negative payment to the manager when he reports θ˜ ∈ Θ˜ = {θ˜1, θ˜2},
project k ∈ {A,B} is chosen, and return from the project is r ∈ X. Denoting sikr =
s(θ˜i, k, r) for brevity, we represent a manager’s contract by (s
i
kx, s
i
k0)i=1,2;k=A,B ∈
<8+. Similarly, we denote the worker’s contract by (wikx, wik0)i=1,2;k=A,B ∈ <8+.
Given a manager’s contract (sikx, s
i
k0)i=1,2;k=A,B and the worker’s contract as
in Lemma 1 that implement (C1), the manager’s expected payoff is
UM := pi[p1s
1
Ax + (1− p1)s1A0] + (1− pi)[qs2Bx + (1− q)s2B0]− c, (1)
the worker’s expected payoff is UW = 0, and the principal’s expected payoff is
UP := V1 − UM − UW = V1 − UM . (2)
We examine the principal choosing manager’s contract to maximize UP subject to
implementing (C1) in centralization.
Let u(θ˜|θ) denote the manager’s interim expected payoff from reporting θ˜ ∈
{θ˜1, θ˜2} when the true state is θ ∈ {θ1, θ2}. That is, for i = 1, 2,
u(θ˜1|θi) = pis1Ax + (1− pi)s1A0 and u(θ˜2|θi) = qs2Bx + (1− q)s2B0.
Then the manager’s expected payoff in (1) is UM = piu(θ˜1|θ1) + (1−pi)K − c where
K = qs2Bx + (1 − q)s2B0. Since the manager first makes a decision on information
gathering and then on his reporting strategy, there are two kinds of incentive com-
patibility (IC) constraints. Interim IC constraints ensure that, once the manager
gathered information, he reports observed signals truthfully:
u(θ˜1|θ1) ≥ K ≥ u(θ˜1|θ2). (3)
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Ex ante IC constraint ensures information gathering: Since, without gathering
information, the manager can report θ1 and obtain an expected payoff piu(θ˜1|θ1) +
(1− pi)u(θ˜1|θ2), or report θ2 and obtain K, the ex ante IC constraint is
UM ≥ max{piu(θ˜1|θ1) + (1− pi)u(θ˜1|θ2), K}
⇐⇒ u(θ˜1|θ1)− c
pi
≥ K ≥ u(θ˜1|θ2) + c
1− pi .
(4)
Since (4) implies (3), the principal’s optimal contracting problem is:
Max(s1
Ar
,s2
Br
)r=x,0∈<4+ UP = V1 − UM subject to (4) (5)
and her own IC constraints, namely, it is indeed optimal for her to choose project
A (B, resp.) if the manager reports θ˜1 (θ˜2, resp.). The principal’s IC constraints
are easily satisfied by setting s1Bx = s
2
Ax = x: the principal’s deviation from (C1)
does not pay off since the entire return goes to the manager. The next proposi-
tion provides the solution to (5) and the principal’s choice of optimal outcome in
centralization with complete contracting.
PROPOSITION 1: In centralization in the complete contracting environment:
(i) The principal can optimally implement outcome (C1) with the worker’s con-
tract (w1Ax, w
1
A0) =
(
`
p1
, 0
)
, and the manager’s contract such that (s1Ax, s
1
A0)
=
(
c
pi(1−pi)(p1−p2) , 0
)
and (s2Bx, s
2
B0) ∈ <2+ satisfying qs2Bx + (1 − q)s2B0 =
c[pip1+(1−pi)p2]
pi(1−pi)(p1−p2) . Then the manager’s expected payoff is UM =
c[pip1+(1−pi)p2]
pi(1−pi)(p1−p2) and
the principal’s expected payoff is UP = V1 − UM .
(ii) Alternatively, the principal can implement outcome (C2) by offering a null con-
tract to the manager, and w = `pip1+(1−pi)p2 to the worker in case of success and
w = 0 otherwise. The principal’s expected payoff is then V2.
(iii) The principal prefers (C1) to (C2) if and only if (1−pi)(qx+`−p2x)−c ≥ UM .
PROOF: See the Appendix.
The intuition behind the manager’s optimal contract that implements (C1)
is as follows. The manager’s contract needs to control the twin incentives of in-
formation gathering and truthful report. To provide incentives for truthful re-
port, the principal needs to reward the manager when θ2 is reported, which is
denoted by K = qs2Bx + (1 − q)s2B0. Since K can be chosen to satisfy (4) so
long as u(θ˜1|θ1) − cpi ≥ u(θ˜1|θ2) + c1−pi , the total compensation to the manager,
piu(θ˜1|θ1) + (1 − pi)K, is minimized when this inequality holds as an equality at
lowest possible level, which happens when s1A0 = 0 and s
1
Ax is set to satisfy the
equality. Note that the manager’s equilibrium expected payoff is strictly positive:
UM = K > 0. As can be seen readily, the reason for the strictly positive expected
payoff is limited liability. Without limited liability, the principal can set K = 0,
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make s1Ax positive and s
1
A0 negative so that the manager’s expected payoff becomes
zero.
As discussed above, limited liability turns out to be crucial in the principal’s
choice of which outcome to implement. Limited liability raises the principal’s cost of
implementing (C1) by limiting the extent to which the manager can be penalized for
lying. The information rent the principal has to pay to the manager given limited
liability is UM =
c[pip1+(1−pi)p2]
pi(1−pi)(p1−p2) , which she does not need to bear when implementing
(C2) since she does not use the manager’s information then. The value of manager’s
information lies in implementing (C1), which is given by (1− pi)(qx+ `− p2x)− c.
Thus if UM > (1−pi)(qx+`−p2x)−c, then the principal would bypass the manager
and implement (C2). Otherwise, she would implement (C1). If there is no limited
liability so that no information rent is needed, then the principal would implement
(C1) under centralization due to Assumption 3, which cannot be improved upon in
any other organizational structure.
Finally, we note that, as mentioned in the previous section, the above outcome
can be also implemented when project choice and return are contractible but the
manager’s report is not. In this case, consider the manager’s contract such that
sAr = s
1
Ar and sBr = s
2
Br for r ∈ X, where s1Ar and s2Br are as specified in
Proposition 1. Then, it is clear that the manager’s IC constraints are satisfied as
before. Those of the principal, namely, p1(x − sAx − `/p1) ≥ qx − UM ≥ p2(x −
sAx − `/p1), can be routinely verified from Assumption 1, (4), and UM = K.
B. Delegation to the Manager
There are three ways in which the principal can delegate one or both types of
authority to the manager, M-delegation, MD-delegation, and MC-delegation. We
will establish that all three organizational structures are equivalent to centralization
in implementing (C1) by showing that the effective IC constraints for the manager
are the same as those in centralization. Consequently, the principal’s cost of imple-
menting (C1) is the same.
Let us start with M-delegation that implements (C1). Since there is no re-
porting by the manager in this case, the principal offers a contract contingent
upon the project choice and return, denoted by (skx, sk0)k=A,B , to the manager,
who makes a project choice and offers a contract (wAx, wA0) to the worker if he
chooses project A. Recall from Lemma 1 that the optimal contract for the worker
is (wAx, wA0) = (`/p1, 0). Since the principal’s IC constraints are irrelevant in the
current case, we move on to the manager’s IC constraints.
Given contracts (skx, sk0)k=A,B and (wAx, wA0) that implement (C1) in M-
delegation, the manager’s expected payoff is
U ′M = piu(A|θ1) + (1− pi)K − c. (6)
where u(A|θ1) = p1(sAx − `/p1) + (1− p1)sA0 and K = qsBx + (1− q)sB0.
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To check interim IC constraints, we consider the following possible deviations
by the manager. Upon observing θ1, either he may select project A but induce
shirk from the worker by offering (wAx, wA0) = (0, 0), thus obtaining a payoff of
sA0, or he may select project B without engaging the worker to obtain a payoff
K. Thus, the first set of interim IC constraints is u(A|θ1) ≥ max{sA0,K}. Upon
observing θ2, he may select project A and then either induce work from the worker
and obtain an expected payoff u(A|θ2) = p2(sAx − `/p1) + (1 − p2)sA0, or induce
shirk from the worker and obtain sA0. So the second set of interim IC constraints
is K ≥ max{u(A|θ2), sA0}. Put together, interim IC constraints are
u(A|θ1) ≥ K ≥ max{u(A|θ2), sA0}. (7)
Given the interim IC constraints in (7), ex ante IC constraints require that the
manager cannot obtain a payoff exceeding (6) by not gathering information. Since
the manager cannot take state-dependent action without information gathering,
there are three deviations to consider: (i) ψm(θi) = A for i = 1, 2 and δw = 1,
which leads to his expected payoff piu(A|θ1) + (1 − pi)u(A|θ2); (ii) ψm(θi) = A for
i = 1, 2 but δw = 0, leading to his expected payoff sA0; (iii) ψm(θi) = B for i = 1, 2,
which results in his expected payoff K. Since K ≥ sA0 from (7), the IC constraint
in case (ii) is satisfied if the constraint is satisfied in case (iii). Hence, ex ante IC
constraints require that (6) exceeds the payoffs of (i) and (iii):
u(A|θ1)− c
pi
≥ K ≥ u(A|θ2) + c
1− pi . (8)
Since the inequalities in (8) imply all the inequalities in (7) except K ≥ sA0,
the optimal implementation of (C1) in M-delegation is the solution to
Max(sAr,sBr)r=x,0∈<4+ V1 + p1`− U
′
M subject to (8) and K ≥ sA0. (9)
Observe from the discussions up to now that both (5) and (9) amount to minimizing
piu(A|θ1) + (1 − pi)K by choosing K > 0 and sAr ≥ 0 for r = x, 0, with one extra
constraint for (9), namely, K ≥ sA0. However, since we have already shown that
the solution to (5) satisfies this extra constraint (Proposition 1), it follows that the
solutions to (5) and (9) are the same. That is, the IC constrains for implementing
(C1) are effectively identical in centralization and in M-delegation and consequently,
the principal’s equilibrium expected payoff in M-delegation is the same as that in
centralization. The only difference is that, in M-delegation, the payment to the
manager includes the payment to the worker, which in equilibrium will be passed
on to the worker when project A is chosen.
The case of MC-delegation is analogous to M-delegation. The only difference
between the two is that the principal has the decision authority in the former.
However, this difference does not change the manager’s incentive problem. Even
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when the manager does not have the decision authority, he has the de facto decision
authority in implementing (C1): through his report, he can induce the principal to
choose the project he prefers. Moreover, the optimal contract for the worker is the
same regardless of who has the contracting authority as per Lemma 1. Based on
this, it is easy to verify that the manager’s IC constraints in MC-delegation are
equivalent to those in M-delegation. Therefore, the principal’s optimal contracting
problem has the same solution in the two cases.
Finally consider MD-delegation. As in M-delegation, denote the manager’s
interim expected payoff by u(A|θi) when he chooses project A in θi, and K when
he chooses project B in either state. Then his interim IC constraints are u(A|θ1) ≥
K ≥ u(A|θ2). For the manager’s ex ante IC constraints, note that the manager
has fewer ways of deviation in MD-delegation compared to M-delegation because,
without the contracting authority, he is unable to induce different actions from the
worker in different states. Once again, we can analyze the manager’s ex ante IC
constraints in two cases, with or without information gathering. With information
gathering, it is easy to see that interim IC constraints imply ex ante IC constraints.
This leaves only the cases without information gathering: (i) ψm(θi) = A for i = 1, 2;
(ii) ψm(θi) = B for i = 1, 2. These ex ante IC constraints are equivalent to (4) with
u(θ˜1|θi) replaced by u(A|θi). Consequently, the principal’s optimal contracting
problem is the same as in centralization, hence has the same solution.
PROPOSITION 2: In the complete contracting environment, M-delegation, MC-
delegation and MD-delegation are all equivalent to centralization in implementing
the outcome (C1).
C. Delegation to the Worker
The principal can also delegate one or both types of authority to the worker. In
WC-delegation, the worker has the contracting authority while the principal retains
the decision authority. In WD-delegation, the worker has the decision authority but
not the contracting authority. In W-delegation, both types of authority are dele-
gated to the worker. In all these delegation modes, the manager’s communication
is part of the game, which is written into contracts. Except in WD-delegation, the
worker offers a contract to the manager and, therefore, the worker’s net payoff in
each contractible contingency is his payment from the principal less his payment to
the manager.
Consider first WD-delegation. Note that the manager’s incentive problem in
WD-delegation is the same as in centralization. The only difference is whom he
reports to, which is irrelevant for his incentives in equilibrium that implements (C1).
For WD-delegation to implement (C1), the worker needs to be given incentives to
choose project A and work given the manager’s report of θ˜1, and choose project
B given the manager’s report of θ˜2. This is easily achieved by extending the same
worker’s contract as in centralization, i.e., that pays him `/p1 when project A is
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chosen and return is x and 0 in all other contingencies. Thus the principal can
implement (C1) without leaving any rent to the worker. In sum, delegating only
the decision authority to the worker does not raise the cost of implementing (C1)
relative to centralization.
PROPOSITION 3: In the complete contracting environment, WD-delegation is
equivalent to centralization in implementing (C1).
PROOF: See the Appendix.
When the worker is delegated the contracting authority, the equivalence result
above no longer holds. The main reason for this comes from the cost of inducing
the worker to choose project B when the manager reports θ˜2. In centralization,
the worker is not engaged when the manager reports θ˜2, and the principal needs
to satisfy only the manager’s IC constraints to truthfully report θ˜2, which involves
rewarding the manager by a positive payment when θ˜2 is truthfully reported. When
the worker has the contracting authority, the same reward has to be made to the
manager by the worker. Since this payment should be included in the primary
contract the principal offers the worker, the worker can earn a positive rent by
marginally inducing the manager to always report θ˜2 without gathering information,
e.g., by offering a contract stipulating a small payment only when θ˜2 is reported. To
counter such incentives, the worker’s expected payoff when θ˜1 is reported should be
made sufficiently positive as well. Since the worker enjoys no rent in centralization,
it follows that the principal is strictly worse off in W-delegation and WC-delegation.
PROPOSITION 4: In the complete contracting environment, centralization domi-
nates W-delegation and WC-delegation in implementing (C1).
PROOF: See the Appendix.
The above dominance result parallels what McAfee and McMillan (1995) called
‘organizational diseconomies of scale’, although their model is distinctly different
from ours. In centralization, the principal needs to leave a positive information rent
only to the manager. In W-delegation and WC-delegation, the worker replaces the
principal in contracting with the manager. Without direct contact with the man-
ager, the principal can motivate the manager only through motivating the worker.
This requires leaving a positive rent to the worker as well. As in McAfee and
McMillan, this ‘double marginalization of rent’ is due to limited liability. Without
limited liability, the manager enjoys no information rent in centralization. There-
fore, the principal does not need to leave a positive rent to the worker to motivate the
manager. To see this, denote the manager’s equilibrium contract in centralization
without limited liability by s˜1Ax > 0, s˜
1
A0 < 0 and qs˜
2
Bx + (1− q)s˜2B0 = K˜ = 0. We
know that the worker’s equilibrium contract in centralization leaves no rent to him,
which is denoted by w˜1Ax = `/p1, w˜
1
A0 = 0. Then, it is straightforward to verify that
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(C1) can be implemented in W-delegation or WC-delegation if the primary contract
for the worker on the equilibrium path is the sum of the above two contracts,(18)
rendering W-delegation and WC-delegation equivalent to centralization. Combined
with the results so far, the above discussion implies that, without limited liability,
centralization is equivalent to all delegated organizational structures.
V. Partial Contracting
In the partial contracting environment, contracts can be written only on the
return. Neither the manager’s report nor project choice can be used for contracting
purposes. Hence, we denote a contract by (sx, s0) ∈ <2+ for the manager where
sr is the payment when return is r ∈ {x, 0}; and similarly, (wx, w0) ∈ <2+ for the
worker. Nonetheless, there is communication of manager’s information except when
the manager has the decision authority. Such communication is observable, albeit
not contractible, to all the parties. Our focus is again on the principal’s expected
payoff from implementing (C1) in alternative organizational structures.
A. Centralization
Suppose (C1) is implemented in centralization with contracts (sx, s0) ∈ <2+ for
the manager and (wx, w0) ∈ <2+ for the worker, where wx = `/p1 and w0 = 0 as in
Lemma 1. The manager’s ex ante IC constraints are
(q − p2)(sx − s0) ≥ c
1− pi and (10)
(p1 − q)(sx − s0) ≥ c
pi
(11)
where (10) ((11), resp.) ensures that the manager prefers information gathering and
truthful reporting to always reporting θ˜1 (θ˜2, resp.) without gathering information.
It is easily verified that the manager’s interim IC constraints, (p1 − q)(sx − s0) ≥ 0
and (q − p2)(sx − s0) ≥ 0, are implied by (10) and (11).
Since p1 > q and p1 > p2 by Assumption 1, we divide analysis into two cases.
First, if p2 ≥ q, then there does not exist (sx, s0) that satisfies (10) and (11).
Thus centralization cannot implement (C1) and the principal’s optimal choice is to
implement (C2). Second, if q > p2, then (10) and (11) imply the following optimal
contract for the manager: s0 = 0, sx = max
{
c
(1−pi)(q−p2) ,
c
pi(p1−q)
}
. However,
Assumption 2 implies pip1 + (1− pi)p2 > q, i.e., pi(p1 − q) > (1− pi)(q − p2), which
in turn implies sx =
c
(1−pi)(q−p2) and (11) is slack. Then it is trivial to verify that
the principal’s IC constraints are satisfied for project choice in implementing (C1).
PROPOSITION 5: In centralization in the partial contracting environment:
(18) It is easy to specify the contract off the equilibrium path that can satisfy the worker’s IC
constraints for (C1).
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(i) If q ≤ p2, then the principal cannot implement (C1). The principal implements
(C2) instead and her expected payoff is UP = V2.
(ii) If q > p2, then the principal can optimally implement (C1) with the manager’s
contract (sx, s0) =
(
c
(1−pi)(q−p2) , 0
)
and the worker’s contract (wx, w0) =
(
`
p1
, 0
)
.
The manager’s expected payoff is UM =
c[pip1+(1−pi)p2]
(1−pi)(q−p2) and the principal’s ex-
pected payoff is UP = V1 − UM . The principal prefers (C1) to (C2) if and only
if (1− pi)(qx+ `− p2x)− c ≥ UM .
The first part of Proposition 5 shows that, if q ≤ p2 then it is impossible to
induce the manager to gather information in the partial contracting environment.
The intuition is as follows. Given q ≤ p2 and that his compensation is based only
on return, the manager would prefer to have project A undertaken regardless of the
true state if sx > s0. On the other hand, he would prefer project B undertaken
regardless of the true state if sx ≤ s0. Thus the value of information is nil from
the manager’s point of view and, consequently, information gathering cannot be
induced. Note that, with complete contracting, the principal has a much better
handle on this since the manager’s contract can be based on project choice as well.
In particular, when compensation is more sensitive to return when A is undertaken
than when B is, while the overall payoff from B is higher than when A is undertaken
in the unfavorable state, information gathering can be induced.
If q > p2, then the manager prefers project A when θ = θ1 and B when θ = θ2
so long as sx > s0. Therefore, information gathering can be induced by making
sx − s0 large enough so that the value of information to the manager exceeds the
cost of information gathering. Nonetheless, it is more costly for the principal to
induce information gathering when she is unable to write complete contracts. How
large is the loss to the principal from partial contracting, compared to complete
contracting? Since this question is irrelevant if she implements (C2) in both con-
tracting environments, we discuss the question in two other cases. First, (C1) is
implemented with complete contracting but (C2) is with partial contracting. Such
a possibility exists if p2 ≥ q. That the principal implements (C1) in the complete
contracting environment implies that her expected payoff V1 − UCM is larger than
V2 where U
C
M denotes the manager’s equilibrium expected payoff shown in Propo-
sition 1. Since the principal’s expected payoff from (C2) is V2, her loss from partial
contracting in this case is V1 − V2 − UCM . Second, (C1) is implemented in both
contracting environments. The principal’s expected payoff from (C1) is V1 − UCM
with complete contracting and V1 − UPM with partial contracting where UPM is the
manager’s expected payoff shown in Proposition 5. As expected, the manager’s
expected payoff is larger in the partial contracting environment: UPM > U
C
M can
be verified easily from pip1 + (1 − pi)p2 > q. Thus the principal’s loss from partial
contracting in this case is UPM − UCM .
Finally, note that the positive rent to the manager when (C1) is implemented
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is once again due to limited liability. Without limited liability, the principal can set
s0 < 0 and sx > 0 and make the manager’s equilibrium expected payoff equal to
zero. Such (sx, s0) can be found by substituting the binding IC constraint into the
manager’s expected payoff, which is then set equal to zero: sx =
c[1−pip1−(1−pi)p2]
(1−pi)(q−p2) ,
s0 = − c[pip1+(1−pi)p2](1−pi)(q−p2) . Thus, as in the complete contracting environment, the
principal would prefer centralization to any other organizational structures if limited
liability is relaxed and (C1) can be implemented in centralization, i.e., q > p2.
B. Delegation to the Manager
We continue to denote the manager’s contract by (sx, s0) ∈ <2+ and the worker’s
contract by (wx, w0) ∈ <2+ where (wx, w0) = (`/p1, 0) by Lemma 1.
Let us consider M-delegation first. The manager’s IC constraints are similar
to those in the case of complete contracting except for the obvious differences in
contractual form. So we omit the details. Corresponding to the IC constraints in
(8) and (9), we have
p1(sx−`/p1)+(1−p1)s0− c
pi
≥ qsx+(1−q)s0 ≥ p2(sx−`/p1)+(1−p2)s0 + c
1− pi ,
and qsx + (1− q)s0 ≥ s0 ⇐⇒ sx ≥ s0.
Note that sx ≥ s0 is implied by the first inequality since p1 > q. Rearranging the
first two inequalities, all the IC constraints for the manager are then reduced to
(q − p2)(sx − s0) ≥ c
1− pi −
p2`
p1
, and (12)
(p1 − q)(sx − s0) ≥ c
pi
+ `. (13)
Comparison of (10) and (11) with (12) and (13) shows how the manager’s
incentives change in M-delegation. Constraint (12) is a counterpart to (10) in
centralization, which ensures that the manager prefers information gathering and
optimal project choice to always choosing project A without gathering information.
Since the worker is paid only when project A is chosen, the manager needs to pay the
worker in both states if he chooses the latter option. Since the worker’s payment
increases in `, larger ` makes (12) more likely to be satisfied. Note also that, if
q > p2, then (12) admits a larger set of (sx, s0) than (10).
Constraint (13) is a counterpart to (11), which leads the manager to prefer
information gathering and optimal project choice to always choosing project B
without gathering information. Since the manager does not need to pay the worker
with project B, (13) is more likely to be satisfied if ` is smaller. While (13) admits
a smaller set of (sx, s0) than (11), we also note that (11) is slack when (C1) is
implemented in centralization. For future reference, we denote by `∗ the value of
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` that balances the above twin incentives, which is found by setting both (12) and
(13) with equality and solving for ` that equates sx − s0 in (12) and (13):
`∗ :=
cp1[pip1 + (1− pi)p2 − q]
pi(1− pi)q(p1 − p2) . (14)
The reason for the difference in the manager’s IC constraints between central-
ization and M-delegation is that the manager’s contract in M-delegation includes
the payment to the worker, which motivates the manager to gather information
for optimal project choice and hire the worker only when doing so benefits him.
Such a link between the worker’s contract and the manager’s incentives is missing
in centralization. Authority, the contracting authority in particular, provides the
manager with stronger incentives for information gathering and optimal project
choice than in centralization. Thus, (C1) can be implemented in M-delegation for
a larger set of parameter values than in centralization.
PROPOSITION 6: In M-delegation in the partial contracting environment:
(i) Suppose q ≤ p2. If ` ≥ `∗, then the principal can optimally implement (C1)
with the manager’s contract (sx, s0) =
(
pi`+c
pi(p1−q) , 0
)
. If ` < `∗, then the principal
cannot implement (C1).
(ii) Suppose q > p2. If ` ≥ `∗, then the principal can optimally implement (C1) with
the same contract as in (i). If ` < `∗, then the principal can optimally implement
(C1) with the manager’s contract (sx, s0) =
( cp1−(1−pi)p2`
(1−pi)p1(q−p2) , 0
)
.
PROOF: See the Appendix.
In the discussion that led to Proposition 6, it was implied that the difference
in the manager’s incentive problem between centralization and M-delegation is pri-
marily due to the contracting authority, rather than the decision authority. The
manager’s IC constraints for truth-telling in centralization are equivalent to his IC
constraints for project choice when he has the decision authority. However, the
manager’s IC constraints when he has the contracting authority cannot be repli-
cated in centralization, as Proposition 6 shows. Consequently, we may expect MD-
delegation to be equivalent to centralization but MC-delegation to be equivalent to
M-delegation. Indeed, it is not difficult to show that the manager’s IC constraints in
MD-delegation are equivalent to those in centralization while his IC constraints in
MC-delegation are the same as those in M-delegation. So, the proof of the following
proposition is omitted.
PROPOSITION 7: In the partial contracting environment, MD-delegation is equiv-
alent to centralization, and MC-delegation is equivalent to M-delegation in imple-
menting (C1).
C. Delegation to the Worker
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When authority is delegated to the worker, the manager’s incentive problem
does not change from that in centralization. This is the same as in the case of
complete contracting. Once again, the only difference from centralization is whom
the manager reports to. Then Proposition 5 implies that, when q ≤ p2, (C1) cannot
be implemented in any organizational structure where the worker is delegated one
or both types of authority. So, we focus on the case where q > p2.
We start with WD-delegation. In the complete contracting environment, it was
shown to be equivalent to centralization primarily because complete contracts allow
the principal to design the worker’s contract in a way to decouple his incentives for
project choice in the two states. Such decoupling is not possible in the partial
contracting environment. For example, the worker cannot be penalized for wrongly
selecting project B in θ1 since project choice is not contractible; whichever project
is chosen, the worker needs to be paid when return is x. This increases the worker’s
incentive to choose project B unless the reward from success is large enough when
he chooses project A in θ1. In particular, if his (interim) expected payoff from
choosing project A and work in θ1 is zero as in centralization, he would always opt
for project B. What this implies is that the principal should leave a positive rent
to the worker in order to implement (C1) in WD-delegation. Since the manager’s
expected payoff remains the same but the worker’s expected payoff is larger in
WD-delegation than in centralization, the principal is worse off in WD-delegation.
The analysis of W-delegation and WC-delegation is similar to the case of complete
contracting. In addition to the problem identified above, double marginalization of
rent continues to be present as long as the worker has the contracting authority.
Thus, centralization should again dominate these organizational structures.
PROPOSITION 8: In the partial contracting environment, centralization dominates
W-delegation, WC-delegation, and WD-delegation in implementing (C1).
PROOF: See the Appendix.
VI. Centralization vs. Delegation to the Manager
This section returns to our central question of when the principal can benefit
by delegating authority. We first summarize the main findings from the previous
sections. Section IV has shown that there is no reason for the principal to delegate
either type of authority to any agent if she can write complete contracts. Central-
ization dominates all organizational structures where the worker has the contracting
authority, and is equivalent to all other organizational structures. Centralization
is therefore the preferred organizational structure in this case. In Section V, it
was shown that, in the partial contracting environment, centralization continues to
dominate all organizational structures in which the worker is delegated either type
of authority. However, delegating the contracting authority to the manager can
potentially benefit the principal compared to centralization. There are two sources
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of such potential benefits. First, delegation allows the principal to implement an
outcome that cannot be implemented in centralization. Specifically, if q ≤ p2, then
(C1) cannot be implemented in centralization but it can be in M-delegation and
MC-delegation. Second, delegation implements the same outcome as in centraliza-
tion but possibly at lower costs. The latter is the case if q > p2. By analyzing
these two cases, this section shows when delegation to the manager can dominate
centralization. Since MC-delegation is equivalent to M-delegation, our discussion
below proceeds by comparing centralization with M-delegation. In what follows, we
denote the expected payoff from (C1) in centralization by UCM for the manager and
UCP for the principal. The expected payoff from (C1) in M-delegation is denoted by
UDM for the manager and U
D
P for the principal.
A. Partial Contracting When q > p2
This is the case where (C1) can be implemented in both centralization and M-
delegation. From Proposition 5, in centralization, the principal’s expected payoff
from (C1) is
UCP = V1 − UCM = V1 −
c[pip1 + (1− pi)p2]
(1− pi)(q − p2) , (15)
and the principal prefers (C1) to (C2) if and only if UCP ≥ V2, or equivalently,
(q − p2)x+ ` ≥ c[pip1 + (1− pi)q]
(1− pi)2(q − p2) . (16)
Thus (C1) is more likely to be implemented if x and ` are larger, and c and pi are
smaller. Larger x and ` imply more benefits to using the manager’s information
for project choice because (C2) involves a suboptimal project choice and inefficient
effort provision by the worker in θ2. Smaller c implies less cost of using the manager’s
information. Finally, smaller pi implies that the manager’s information is more
valuable. If pi is so large that choosing project A and inducing work is almost
certainly optimal, then the principal is best off implementing (C2) without the
manager’s information.
In M-delegation, there are two possibilities as shown in Proposition 6. Since the
manager’s expected payoff is UDM = pip1(sx − `/p1) + (1− pi)qsx − c, the principal’s
expected payoff when ` < `∗ is
UDP = V1 − UDM = V1 −
[pip1 + (1− pi)q][cp1 − (1− pi)p2`]
(1− pi)p1(q − p2) + pi`+ c (17)
as is evident from Proposition 6 (ii). If ` ≥ `∗, the principal’s expected payoff is
UDP = V1 − UDM = V1 −
q(pi`+ c)
pi(p1 − q) , (18)
which again follows from Proposition 6 (ii) for ` ≥ `∗.
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If (16) is satisfied so that (C1) is implemented in centralization, then we can
say that M-delegation dominates centralization if and only if UDP ≥ UCP or, equiv-
alently, UDM ≤ UCM . If (16) is not satisfied, then the principal implements (C2) in
centralization. This case is the same as when q ≤ p2, which is analyzed in the next
section.
PROPOSITION 9: Suppose q > p2 and that the principal implements (C1) in
centralization, i.e., (16) holds. Then there exists `′ > `∗ such that M-delegation
dominates centralization for all ` ≤ `′.
PROOF: See the Appendix.
The above dominance result can be understood from how delegation changes
the manager’s incentives. Specifically, the contracting authority entrusts the man-
ager with the payment to the worker thereby creating two opposing incentives for
the manager in M-delegation, which are not present in centralization. On the one
hand, the option of always choosing project B without information gathering be-
comes more attractive because it means that he need not pay the worker. On the
other hand, the option of always choosing project A without gathering informa-
tion becomes less attractive because it means that he will have to pay the worker
regardless of the state. Compared to centralization, the former makes the devi-
ation of not gathering information more attractive while the latter makes it less
attractive. These effects can be seen by comparing the manager’s IC constraints
in M-delegation with those in centralization, namely, (13) with (11) and (12) with
(10), respectively. These effects are proportional to ` because larger ` means larger
payment to the worker. When q > p2, (11) is slack in centralization and (13) is
slack in M-delegation. Thus the difference in the cost of implementing (C1) in
the two organizational structures essentially hinges on the comparison of (12) and
(10). Both constraints ensure that the manager prefers (C1) to always choosing
project A without gathering information. As argued above, delegation makes the
latter option less attractive: (12) is easier to satisfy than (10). Therefore, if (C1)
is implementable in centralization for some (sx, s0) that satisfies (10), then it is
implementable in M-delegation with a lower (sx, s0) when ` is not too large.
The cost reduction is a result of a lower rent for the manager, which is possible
because delegation allows the principal to provide more effective incentives to the
manager. It is worth noting that, although the manager’s contract does not depend
on project choice in the partial contracting environment, his payoff in M-delegation
depends on project choice through his decision to exercise the contracting authority.
Such a link between the manager’s payoff and project choice is possible in M-
delegation but not in centralization, which the principal can utilize to better design
the manager’s contract.
Figure 2 shows an example in which we plot the principal’s expected payoffs in
M-delegation and centralization for a set of parameter values that satisfy Assump-
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tions 1 to 3, q > p2, and (16). We set parameter values at p1 = 0.9, p2 = 0.2, q =
0.3, pi = 0.3, c = 0.5, and x = 100. Then `∗ = 1.61 and the upper bound for `
as implied by Assumption 2 is [pip1 + (1 − pi)p2 − q]x = 18. In centralization, the
principal’s expected payoff decreases in `. In M-delegation, it increases up to ` = `∗,
and then decreases thereafter. As shown in Proposition 9, M-delegation dominates
centralization for all values of ` ≤ `∗ = 1.61. When ` > 1.61, M-delegation con-
tinues to dominate centralization until ` reaches `′ ≈ 7.9. Thereafter centralization
dominates M-delegation until ` reaches its upper bound of 18.
— Figure 2 goes about here. —
B. Partial Contracting When q ≤ p2
We showed above that if q > p2, delegation may benefit the principal because
it allows her to implement (C1) at a lower cost than in centralization. We now show
that if q ≤ p2 and ` ≥ `∗, the principal may benefit from M-delegation because it
allows her to implement (C1), which is not feasible in centralization. Not being able
to implement (C1) in centralization, the principal implements (C2) instead. Since
(C2) involves suboptimal project choice and inefficient effort by the worker in θ2,
the benefit of delegation in this case comes primarily from efficiency. The cost of
delegation is the rent that needs to be paid to the manager. We discuss below when
the benefit outweighs the cost.
The principal’s expected payoff in centralization is V2. In M-delegation, Propo-
sition 6 shows that the principal’s expected payoff is the one given in (18). Thus
the net benefit from M-delegation is
∆ := UDP − V2 = −(1− pi)(p2 − q)x+
[
1− pi − q
p1 − q
]
`−
[
1 +
q
pi(p1 − q)
]
c. (19)
The first and the third terms on the right hand side of (19) are negative while
the sign of the second term is indeterminate. It is routinely verified that ∆ can
be positive at some parameter values that satisfy Assumptions 1 to 3, q ≤ p2, and
` ≥ `∗. For example, when p1 = 0.9, p2 = 0.2, q = 0.19, pi = 0.5, c = 0.12, x = 100,
and ` = 3, we have `∗ ≈ 1.17 and ∆ ≈ 0.013. To provide an illustration on how ∆
may change for different parameter values, Figure 3 plots UDP and V2 as we change
c, `, and pi from the above example. The observed pattern is that ∆ > 0 when c is
low and when ` and pi are neither too large nor too small. We establish below that
this pattern is indeed general.
— Figure 3 goes about here. —
A parameter profile is a 7-tuple z = (c, `, x, pi, p1, p2, q) ∈ <3++×(0, 1)4. Let Ξ ⊂
<3++× (0, 1)4 be the interior of the set of parameter profiles such that Assumptions
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1-3 are satisfied, q ≤ p2, ` ≥ `∗, and ∆ > 0. The above example shows Ξ 6= ∅. Given
z ∈ Ξ, we use zz/z′ to denote z with its z-component replaced by z′ for z = c, `, pi.
For z = `, Assumption 2 places an upper bound ¯`z := [pip1 + (1− pi)p2 − q]x on `′
for z`/`′ ∈ Ξ to hold.
Let z ∈ Ξ and consider changes in c, the manager’s cost of gathering informa-
tion. Since ∆ decreases in c, we must have ∆ > 0 for all zc/c′ such that c
′ < c.
This is intuitively clear because higher c means higher cost of inducing the manager
to gather information in M-delegation. Next, consider changes in `, the worker’s
cost of effort. Centralization leads to suboptimal effort choice by the worker since
in (C2) the worker works in θ2 even if his marginal product is less than the cost
of work. An increase in ` magnifies this inefficiency of centralization. Thus, the
efficiency benefit of M-delegation can be measured as V1 − V2, which increases as `
increases: ∂(V1−V2)∂` = 1− pi > 0. On the other hand, an increase in ` also increases
the manager’s compensation in M-delegation:
∂UDM
∂` =
q
p1−q > 0. It is possible to
show that if z ∈ Ξ, the efficiency benefit outweighs the compensation cost for all
z`/`′ such that `
′ ≥ `. Finally, it can be easily verified from (19) that ∆ is strictly
concave in pi. This implies that the information rent to the manager is large relative
to the value of information to the principal when pi is either too small or too large.
In these cases, obtaining information has a limited value and thus, the manager is
reluctant to gather information. The value of manager’s information is larger when
pi has an intermediate value. In implementing (C2), on the other hand, manager’s
rent is irrelevant. These observations lead to the next proposition.
PROPOSITION 10: Ξ 6= ∅. Furthermore, for each z ∈ Ξ:
(i) There is c¯z > 0 such that zc/c′ ∈ Ξ if and only if c′ ∈ (0, c¯z);
(ii) There is `z ≥ `∗ such that z`/`′ ∈ Ξ if and only if `′ ∈ (`z, ¯`z); and
(iii) There is (piz, p¯iz) ⊂ (0, 1) such that zpi/pi′ ∈ Ξ if and only if pi′ ∈ (piz, p¯iz).
PROOF: See the Appendix.
We summarize the main findings of this section. In centralization, the principal
is unable to motivate the manager to gather information. This results in suboptimal
project choice and inefficient effort provision by the worker. M-delegation corrects
this inefficiency but at the cost of manager’s rent necessary to motivate him to
gather and use information for efficient decision-making. Choosing M-delegation
instead of centralization, the principal thus trades off the benefits of manager’s
information against the compensation cost for the manager. The benefits of delega-
tion increase as the manager’s information becomes more valuable and the worker’s
cost of effort increases. The cost of delegation increases as it becomes more costly
for the manager to gather information. As a consequence, M-delegation is more
likely to dominate centralization if the manager’s cost of information gathering is
smaller, the worker’s effort cost is larger, and the manager’s information becomes
29
more valuable. This is in contrast to the case in the previous section. When q > p2,
there is no efficiency loss in centralization. Thus the comparison of centralization
and M-delegation was based primarily on how much rent the manager should be
given in the two organizational structures.
VII. Conclusion
This paper has studied a model with a principal and two agents. One of the
agents, called the manager, can acquire private information that can be used in
choosing an investment project. The other agent, called the worker, exerts private
effort that affects the success probability of the chosen project. The principal sup-
plies funds necessary to undertake the chosen project. Dividing authority into two
types, namely, decision-making authority and contracting authority, and focusing
on the allocation of authority, we have studied the equilibria of different organi-
zational structures in two contracting environments. In the complete contracting
environment, all the publicly observable variables can be used for contracting pur-
poses while, in the partial contracting environment, only the return from the project
is contractible. Under centralization, the principal retains both types of authority
while delegation confers one or both types of authority to the agents.
The central question of this paper is when the principal can benefit from dele-
gation compared to centralization. Our main results can be summarized as follows.
First, the principal cannot benefit from delegation in the complete contracting en-
vironment: she is strictly worse off under some forms of delegation when contracts
are subject to limited liability constraints; without limited liability constraints, any
form of delegation is payoff-equivalent to centralization, which is a direct conse-
quence of the revelation principle. Second, delegation can benefit the principal in
the partial contracting environment when authority, the contracting authority in
particular, is delegated to the manager, but not to the worker.
The benefits from delegating authority to the manager come from two sources.
First, when centralization cannot induce the manager to acquire information and
hence results in a suboptimal investment decision, delegating authority to the man-
ager can motivate him to acquire information, thereby implementing an optimal
investment decision. These efficiency gains from delegation are weighed against the
costs of motivating the manager. Beneficial delegation obtains when the benefits
exceed the costs, which is more likely if the manager’s cost of information acquisi-
tion becomes smaller, the manager’s information becomes more valuable, and the
worker’s cost of effort becomes larger. Second, even when centralization can induce
information acquisition and implement an optimal investment decision, manager
delegation can benefit the principal as it can reduce the rent that the principal
needs to pay the manager under centralization. Conferred with the authority to
contract with the worker, the manager is made a residual claimant in the subcon-
tracting stage. This enables the principal to disentangle the interlocked incentives
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between the manager and the worker, thereby reducing the cost of observing the
manager’s incentive constraints under centralization.
In our model, we did not assume any costs in communicating and processing
information; the only information-related cost was that of information gathering
by the manager. If there were additional costs of communicating information (e.g.,
Laffont and Martimort, 1998) or processing it (e.g., Radner, 1993; Van Zandt,
1999), the case for manager delegation will only be strengthened. An additional
conclusion from this paper is that the delegated agent has more influence upon
his own compensation than the other agent does, since the delegated agent assumes
residual claim in the subcontracting stage. This, combined with the decision-making
authority, can be viewed as a reasonable portrayal of a corporate hierarchy where
top managers, not other stakeholders, are delegated authority, whose key role is
that of direction-setting, and who are often motivated through stock and stock
options. An extension of the current model that can fruitfully elucidate the nature
of incentive pay in multi-tier corporate hierarchies is left for future research.
Appendix
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1: The principal’s optimal contracting problem is
equivalent to minimizing the manager’s expected payoff subject to (4). In any
solution to the principal’s problem, the second IC constraint in (4), K ≥ u(θ˜1|θ2) +
c/(1 − pi), should be necessarily binding. Otherwise, K can be reduced until it
is binding without violating the first IC constraint. Substituting K = u(θ˜1|θ2) +
c/(1− pi) into the first IC constraint and rearranging terms, we have
(p1 − p2)(s1Ax − s1A0) ≥
c
pi(1− pi) . (A1)
Since s1Ax, s
1
A0 ≥ 0, the least costly way to meet (A1) is to set s1Ax = cpi(1−pi)(p1−p2)
and s1A0 = 0. Then any nonnegative s
2
Bx and s
2
B0 can be chosen to satisfy qs
2
Bx +
(1 − q)s2B0 = p2s1Ax + (1 − p2)s1A0 + c/(1 − pi) = c[pip1+(1−pi)p2]pi(1−pi)(p1−p2) . This leads to the
manager’s expected payoff UM = qs
2
Bx + (1− q)s2B0. Since UW = 0, the principal’s
expected payoff from (C1) is then UP = V1 − [qs2Bx + (1 − q)s2B0]. This proves
(i). Proof of (ii) was already given. To show (iii), note that the principal prefers
(C1) to (C2) if and only if V1 − [qs2Bx + (1 − q)s2B0] ≥ V2, which is equivalent to
(1− pi)(qx+ `− p2x)− c ≥ c[pip1+(1−pi)p2]pi(1−pi)(p1−p2) .
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3: Since the manager’s incentive problem in WD-
delegation is the same as that in centralization, it suffices to show that the principal
can implement (C1) without leaving any rent to the worker. For WD-delegation
to implement (C1), the worker’s contract (wikx, w
i
k0)i,k needs to satisfy two sets of
IC constraints for the worker’s project choice. First, given the manager’s report
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of θ˜1, the worker has three options: (i) ψw(θ˜1) = A and δw = 1, which results
in his expected payoff p1w
1
Ax + (1 − p1)w1A0 − `; (ii) ψw(θ˜1) = A but δw = 0,
leading to the expected payoff w1A0; (iii) ψw(θ˜1) = B, leading to the expected payoff
qw1Bx+(1−q)w1B0. To implement (C1), the worker’s expected payoff from option (i)
should not be smaller than that from the other two. In equilibrium that implements
(C1), the worker infers θi from the manager’s report of θ˜i. Thus the first set of IC
constraints can be written as:
p1w
1
Ax + (1− p1)w1A0 − ` ≥ max{w1A0, qw1Bx + (1− q)w1B0}. (A2)
Given the manager’s report of θ˜2, the worker again has the same three options,
leading to the second set of IC constraints:
qw2Bx + (1− q)w2B0 ≥ max{p2w2Ax + (1− p2)w2A0 − `, w2A0}. (A3)
Clearly (A2) and (A3) are independent. Thus (w1Ar, w
1
Br)r=x,0 can be chosen to
satisfy (A2), and (w2Ar, w
2
Br)r=x,0 to satisfy (A3). The least costly way to do so
is to set all payments equal to zero except w1Ax = `/p1. This is the same as in
centralization.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 4: Denote the worker’s contract by (wikr)i,k,r and the
manager’s contract by (sikr)i,k,r. The worker’s net payoff in contingency (i, k, r) is
wikr − sikr. As noted before, the manager’s incentive problem in either delegation
mode is the same as in centralization. Therefore, if the worker is to induce infor-
mation gathering and truth-telling from the manager, then he would offer exactly
the same contract as that offered by the principal in centralization: s1Ax, s
2
Bx, s
2
B0
are as in Proposition 1, and s1A0 = 0. Henceforth, we denote these payments by s˜
1
Ax
and K˜ := qs˜2Bx + (1 − q)s˜2B0. When (C1) is implemented, the worker’s expected
payoff is
UW := pi[p1(w
1
Ax− s˜1Ax) + (1−p1)w1A0− `] + (1−pi)[qw2Bx+ (1− q)w2B0− K˜]. (A4)
Consider now the following deviation by the worker. Suppose the worker offers
the manager a contract that induces him not to gather information and always
report θ˜2. An example of such a contract is s
1
kr = s
2
Ar = 0 for k = A,B and
r = x, 0, and any nonnegative (s2Bx, s
2
B0) such that qs
2
Bx + (1 − q)s2B0 = ε < c
for sufficiently small ε > 0. Given the manager’s report of θ˜2, suppose the worker
chooses project B in W-delegation. In equilibrium that implements (C1) in WC-
delegation, the principal chooses project B given θ˜2. In either case, the worker’s ex
ante expected payoff from this deviation is qw2Bx+(1−q)w2B0−ε. For W-delegation
or WC-delegation to implement (C1), UW in (A4) should not be less than the above
expected payoff. Moreover we must have qw2Bx+ (1− q)w2B0 ≥ K˜ for the manager’s
contract to be feasible for the worker to offer. Thus UW ≥ qw2Bx+ (1− q)w2B0− ε ≥
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K˜ − ε. Since K˜ > 0, there is ε > 0 such that the worker’s expected payoff is
strictly positive in equilibrium that implements (C1). Therefore to implement (C1)
in W-delegation or WC-delegation, the worker should necessarily be given a strictly
positive rent. Recall that the worker’s expected payoff is zero in centralization when
(C1) is implemented. Since the manager’s equilibrium expected payoff is the same
in centralization, W-delegation and WC-delegation when (C1) is implemented, the
principal is strictly worse off in W-delegation and WC-delegation.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 6: In equilibrium that implements (C1), the principal
chooses (sx, s0) to minimize the manager’s expected payoff subject to (12) and (13).
Suppose q ≤ p2. Then (12) and (13) become
sx − s0 ≤ 1
q − p2
( c
1− pi −
p2`
p1
)
, (A5)
sx − s0 ≥ 1
p1 − q
( c
pi
+ `
)
. (A6)
Note that 1q−p2
(
c
1−pi− p2`p1
) ≥ 1p1−q ( cpi +`) if and only if ` ≥ `∗. Thus the intersection
of the two constraints is nonempty if ` ≥ `∗. In this case, (A6) is binding at the
solution to the principal’s optimal contracting problem with the manager. This
leads to s0 = 0 and sx =
pi`+c
pi(p1−q) . If ` < `
∗, then the intersection of the above two
constraints is empty. Thus (C1) cannot be implemented.
Suppose now q > p2. Then the inequality in (A5) is reversed. Moreover we
have 1q−p2
(
c
1−pi − p2`p1
) ≤ 1p1−q ( cpi + `) if and only if ` ≥ `∗. Therefore, if ` ≥ `∗, then
only (A6) is binding and, therefore, the principal’s optimal offer to the manager is
the same as above. If ` < `∗, then (A5) is binding. Solving it for sx with s0 = 0
gives us sx =
cp1−(1−pi)p2`
(1−pi)p1(q−p2) .
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 8: For the cases of W-delegation and WC-delegation
the proof is similar to that of Proposition 4 and is omitted. We consider WD-
delegation below.
Since the manager’s incentive problem in WD-delegation is the same as that in
centralization and the worker’s expected payoff in centralization is zero, it suffices
to show that the worker’s expected payoff in WD-delegation is strictly positive.
For WD-delegation to implement (C1), the worker’s contract (wx, w0) needs to
satisfy two sets of IC constraints for the worker’s project choice. First, given the
manager’s report of θ˜1, the worker has three options: (i) ψw(θ˜1) = A and δw = 1,
which results in his expected payoff p1wx + (1 − p1)w0 − `; (ii) ψw(θ˜1) = A but
δw = 0, leading to the expected payoff w0; (iii) ψw(θ˜1) = B, leading to the expected
payoff qwx + (1 − q)w0. To implement (C1), the worker’s expected payoff from
option (i) should not be smaller than that from the other two. Thus the first set of
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IC constraints can be written as:
p1wx + (1− p1)w0 − ` ≥ max{w0, qwx + (1− q)w0}
⇐⇒ wx − w0 ≥ `/(p1 − q).
(A7)
Given the manager’s report of θ˜2, the worker again has the same three options,
leading to the second set of IC constraints:
qwx + (1− q)w0 ≥ max{p2wx + (1− p2)w0 − `, w0}
⇐⇒ (q − p2)(wx − w0) + ` ≥ 0, wx ≥ w0.
(A8)
Since p1 > q > p2, (A7) implies (A8). Thus the optimal contract for the worker is
wx = `/(p1 − q), w0 = 0. Then the worker’s expected payoff is pi(p1wx − `) + (1−
pi)qwx = q`/(p1 − q) > 0.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 9: Suppose ` < `∗. Denote the manager’s expected
payoff in this case by UD1M , which is given in (17). Direct calculation shows
UCM − UD1M =
p2[pip1 + (1− pi)q]`
p1(q − p2) + pi` > 0. (A9)
Thus M-delegation dominates centralization for all values of ` < `∗. Suppose next
` ≥ `∗. Then the relevant expected payoff for the manager is given in (18), which
we denote by UD2M . Recall that `
∗ was defined as the value of `, at which the
manager’s IC constraints (12) and (13) are equivalent and both hold with equality.
Thus UD2M |`=`∗ = lim`→`∗UD1M < UCM . Since UD2M is continuous and increasing in `
while UCM is independent of `, there is `
′ > `∗ such that UDM ≤ UCM for all ` ∈ (`∗, `′].
Combining the two cases gives us the proposition.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 10: We have already shown Ξ 6= ∅. Take an arbitrary
z ∈ Ξ. Note that (19) decreases in c. It is trivial to verify that Assumptions 1-3
and ` ≥ `∗ continue to hold when c decreases. Hence, setting c¯z as the minimum
of the upper bounds of c determined by Assumption 3, ` ≥ `∗, and ∆ > 0, proves
part (i) of the Proposition.
Since the first and the third terms of the RHS of (19) are negative, z ∈ Ξ
implies that 1 − pi − qp1−q > 0, which in turn implies that ∆ increases in `. It is
easy to verify that Assumptions 1-3 and ` ≥ `∗ continue to hold when ` increases
up to ¯`z, but Assumption 2 is violated if it increases above ¯`z. Hence, setting `z as
the maximum of the lower bounds of ` determined by Assumption 1, Assumption
3, ` ≥ `∗, and ∆ > 0, proves part (ii) of the Proposition.
Finally, it is easy to check that ∂
2∆
∂pi2 < 0, hence ∆ is strictly concave in pi.
Since ∆ > 0 at z, ∆ > 0 also holds as pi changes within an interval, say I ⊂ (0, 1).
By the same token, the condition ` ≥ `∗ holds as pi changes within an interval,
say J ⊂ (0, 1). Let piz be the maximum of inf I, inf J , and the lower bound on
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pi determined by Assumption 2. Let p¯iz be the minimum of sup I, sup J , and the
upper bound on pi determined by Assumption 3. This establishes part (iii) of the
Proposition.
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